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Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/58/150.

I. Introduction

1. A major disaster befell the United Nations on 19 August 2003, when 15 United Nations staff members and seven others were killed and well over 100 wounded in a bomb attack on our headquarters in Baghdad. That disaster deprived the international community of some of its most talented servants, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who was serving as my Special Representative for Iraq. While the full implications of the attack have yet to be thought through, they clearly involve important issues relating to the kind of mandates entrusted to the United Nations by its Member States and our capacity to carry them out.

2. The body of the present report was written before that event, and it is in any case not a report on the United Nations as such, but rather on the distance travelled by humanity as a whole towards — or away from — the objectives set for it by the world leaders who met in New York in September 2000. Nonetheless, I find it essential to begin by referring to the attack of 19 August, because I see it as a direct challenge to the vision of global solidarity and collective security rooted in the Charter of the United Nations and articulated in the Millennium Declaration. Its significance thus reaches beyond the tragedy that affects us personally, as individuals, or even institutionally, as an Organization.

3. Indeed, I see the attack as the latest in a series of events that led me to give this report a different form from that adopted last year. Even before the tragedy, I felt that a simple progress report could hardly do justice to what we had lived through in the last 12 months. In the area of peace and security, in particular, the consensus expressed or implied in the Declaration now looks less solid than it did three years ago. In the area of development, by contrast, a stronger consensus has been forged, but grave doubts remain as to whether Member States are sufficiently determined to act on it. And in the area of human rights and democracy there is a danger that we may retreat from some of the important gains made in the previous decade.

4. I think it necessary, therefore, under the three above-mentioned headings, to evaluate not only the progress made, or not made, but also the obstacles encountered, and to re-examine some of the underlying assumptions of the Declaration. We can no longer take

it for granted that our multilateral institutions are strong enough to cope with all of the challenges facing them. I suggest in my conclusion that some of the institutions may be in need of radical reform.

II. Peace and security

5. Since the Millennium Summit, the international community has had to deal with both new and old threats to international peace and security. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 shocked the world and were immediately condemned with unprecedented speed by the Security Council and the General Assembly. The United Nations moved swiftly to put extensive counter-terrorism measures in place, involving new obligations by States and the promotion of effective national policies to prevent terrorism and its financing. Following the downfall of the Taliban, Member States were also united in their support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, providing encouragement to the new Transitional Administration as well as generous financial assistance.

6. This climate of cooperation and consensus was seriously eroded by the war against Iraq in the spring of 2003. While the Security Council agreed on the need to disarm Iraq of all weapons of mass destruction, it could not agree on the means to achieve this aim. The war exposed deep divisions in the international community, with accusations of double agendas. Although the Security Council has since been able to find common ground on the need to restore Iraqi sovereignty and reconstruct the country, divisions remain that will not be easily overcome. The war in Iraq brought to the fore a host of questions of principle and practice that challenge the United Nations and the international community as a whole. New and potentially more virulent forms of terrorism, the proliferation of non-conventional weapons, the spread of transnational criminal networks and the ways in which all these things may be coming together to reinforce one another are viewed in some parts of the world as the dominant threats to peace and security in our time. Questions are being raised about the adequacy and effectiveness of the rules and instruments at the disposal of the international community to confront this new array of challenges. The very relevance of current multilateral rules and institutions has come into question.

7. At the same time, for many around the globe, poverty, deprivation and civil war remain the highest priority. Civilians inevitably bear the cost of the complex and intractable conflicts that have led to the death or forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, and which can only be addressed by a more integrated collective approach to their deepening protection needs.

8. Africa's development, in particular, continues to be hampered by war. Many of the continent's recent conflicts have been characterized by extreme acts of violence perpetrated against civilians, including brutal acts of torture, rape, mutilation, harassment and executions. Children are routinely subject to abduction and forced militarization, perpetuating a youth culture of alienation and violence. In the last year, progress achieved in Angola and the Sudan has been overshadowed by continued conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed violence in Côte d'Ivoire and bloody fighting in Liberia, leading to widespread terror, social upheaval and mass displacement. For the international community, these national emergencies have developed into broader "crises of protection".

9. Throughout its history, the United Nations has had to confront challenges such as intra-state war, terrorism and other man-made or natural disasters. What is new is the fast evolving global context within which all these threats are now emerging and the opportunity, in our ever more interconnected world, for local crises and violence to quickly acquire global reach and consequence.

10. The performance of the international community in dealing with these threats and challenges is uneven. Notably, we continue to lack the needed political will, as well as a common vision of our responsibility in the face of massive violations of human rights and humanitarian catastrophes occasioned by conflict. In my statement delivered at the opening of the general debate at the fifty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1999, I challenged Member States to address this vitally important problem. The results to date have not been encouraging. Although the international community has witnessed massacres of near genocidal proportions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia, our response to them has been hesitant and tardy.

11. It is hoped that the recently constituted International Criminal Court will punish the perpetrators of the most heinous of such crimes and thus help to deter them in future. But no legal order can function in isolation from the everyday protection of human life. Mass murder and crimes against humanity must be prevented and, when they take place, stopped by immediate effective action. As the recent report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty explained, there is a need for a comprehensive understanding and effective exercise of the responsibility to protect.

12. It is vitally important that the international community not allow the differences of the past months to persist and that it find unity of purpose based on a common security agenda. This can only be achieved if States, in pursuing their national interests, show understanding and respect for global realities and the needs of others. The common security agenda should reflect a global consensus on the major threats to peace and security, be they old or new, and our common response. It should strengthen international solidarity based on the shared universal values enshrined in the Charter and should not shy away from the need to improve and, where necessary, change the structure and functions of the United Nations and other international institutions.

13. The great strength of the United Nations remains its legitimacy, founded on the bedrock principles of international law accepted by all States and expressed in the decisions of an Organization which represents the entire international community. In the international arena there is no substitute for such legitimacy. It is essential, therefore, that the actual conduct of international affairs be in conformity with these principles. The United Nations finds itself at a critical juncture: unless the Security Council regains the confidence of States and of world public opinion, individual States will increasingly resort exclusively to their own national perceptions of emerging threats and to their own judgement on how best to address them. To forestall such a development, the United Nations will have to demonstrate its ability to deal with the most difficult issues, and to do so effectively.

14. Legitimacy and political will are necessary, but they alone are not enough. The international community must also have appropriate rules and tools in place to deal effectively with threats to peace and security. The Charter and the array of international

conventions negotiated over the last several decades constitute a solid framework for international cooperation, a framework which has served us well. To ensure that the international security architecture continues to play this role effectively, it must be able to adapt to the needs of our time.

15. In particular, the ability of the Security Council to garner the widest possible support for its decisions and its actions will be enhanced if it is perceived to be broadly representative of the international community as a whole as well as the geopolitical realities of the contemporary world. I hope, therefore, that Member States will redouble their efforts to reach agreement on the enlargement of the Security Council.

Weapons of mass destruction: the need to strengthen and complement existing regimes

16. Ridding the world of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is a long-standing aim of the United Nations. In recent years, however, the proliferation of such weapons, especially nuclear ones, has been of increasing concern. In addition, there is a growing fear that non-state actors may acquire and use chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons.

17. It was understood from the beginning that the nuclear non-proliferation regime by itself could not completely prevent these weapons from spreading, not even from spreading to States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, if such States were absolutely determined to acquire them. The aim, rather, was to outlaw the spread of such weapons and to provide sufficient transparency to identify potential problem cases. To reinforce the non-proliferation regime, those countries with the technological capacity took steps over the years to tighten export controls, although a clandestine market continued to exist. In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provided for more intrusive inspections via an additional protocol, although that protocol remains voluntary. Further improvements are required on both fronts if the existing regime is to be strengthened.

18. Some States pursue nuclear weapons while others do not. It is estimated that as many as 40 countries that could have developed at least modest nuclear arsenals have chosen not to do so. This underlines the need to address the underlying conflicts and tensions that

motivate those seeking to use such weapons. At the present juncture, renewed efforts are especially needed to develop viable subregional security arrangements in a number of areas in Asia, with the aim of diminishing and removing security threats that motivate the quest for nuclear weapons. It is also vital to ensure that the development of nuclear energy and of nuclear weapons remain separate from one another.

19. At the same time, we must acknowledge the adverse consequences of applying a double standard. There can be no “good” or “bad” proliferation, since any act of proliferation can lead to greater instability in the future. Nuclear weapons States have, for their part, done too little to diminish the symbolic importance of these weapons and too little to fulfil their commitment to undertake good faith efforts at moving towards significant nuclear arms reductions and ultimate disarmament.

20. A major weakness of all weapons of mass destruction regimes — nuclear, chemical and biological — is their weak enforcement provisions, which essentially leave the penalties for non-compliance unspecified. This matter deserves review and possible action, some of which should be undertaken within the framework of the United Nations, including the Security Council.

21. At present, there are no multilateral means in place to deal with the threat posed by non-state actors seeking to wield nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, the fear of which has been growing since the early 1990s. Ultimately, the international community is a “self-help” system, not a suicide pact: if institutionalized rules and mechanisms do not exist, States will resort to other means to reduce or eliminate threats to their way of life — or to their very existence.

Small arms

22. While considering the major threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, we should not forget the very real dangers emanating from the use of more conventional weapons. It is small arms that keep on killing millions of people and are readily available at very low cost even in the most remote corners of the world. The difficulties we confront in trying to curb the illicit traffic of these weapons should not be underestimated. However, with the cooperation of all countries, it should be possible to tighten export

controls and facilitate the identification of the sources of illicit weapons through the use of markings.

Sanctions

23. In dealing with violations of non-proliferation, human rights and other international regimes, the use of sanctions is sometimes necessary to modify the behaviour of the parties and to ensure the implementation of Security Council resolutions. However, neither innocent civilian populations nor neighbouring States should be required to bear the burden of international enforcement actions. It is both fairer and more productive to target sanctions at the individuals and political elites that are responsible for international aggression, egregious violations of human rights and other reprehensible acts. Important work in that direction has been done by the Security Council, as well as by individual Member States. This has resulted in a number of practical proposals concentrated on financial sanctions, arms embargoes and travel bans, as well as on the overall effectiveness of targeted sanctions. The results achieved within the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm processes represent an important reserve of ideas upon which the Security Council can draw when designing future sanctions regimes.

Terrorism

24. Terrorism is an issue the United Nations has been dealing with for a long time. Nor is "international" terrorism, in the sense of groups employing terrorist methods across international boundaries, a new phenomenon. What may be new is the greater integration and inter-connectedness of our world today, which may afford greater opportunity to groups considering the use of terrorist methods to learn or in other ways benefit from one another and to exploit the opportunities made possible by the erosion of State borders and the "looser" nature of international markets and mechanisms.

25. The United Nations has a long-standing involvement in efforts to combat terrorism. Traditionally, this was approached through establishing international norms that treated terrorism as a crime. In the 1990s, driven by the Lockerbie bombing and the attacks on United States embassies in Africa, the Organization began to consider terrorism as a serious

threat to international peace and security and the Security Council began to impose sanctions against States sponsoring international terrorism.

26. The attacks of 11 September 2001 triggered a more proactive approach, partly in response to the growing evidence of terrorist networks that were not linked to any specific State. Accordingly, Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) imposed binding obligations on all States to take steps to prevent terrorism and its financing, and established the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which has become the main vehicle for ensuring compliance. All 191 States Members of the United Nations have now submitted a first round report on the measures they have instituted, while more than 50 have submitted a second, and some even a third, report.

27. The Counter-Terrorism Committee seeks to ensure that Member States have the necessary legislation and executive machinery in place to comply with the requirements of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), including the capacity to counter the financing of terrorism. The work of the Committee also aims to improve the flow of information on international best practices, codes and standards in the area of counter-terrorism, as well as enhancing counter-terrorism assistance. All this should also help the international community to address more effectively the linkages between terrorism, money-laundering and organized crime, which are among the most serious challenges to stability and peace in our era.

28. The strengthening of counter-terrorism carries with it new challenges, most notably the question of how to ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and how to meet the requirements of international law as they apply to the protection of civilians. Terrorism itself is a violation of fundamental human rights and must be combated as such. Efforts at combating it must be pursued, however, in full compliance with established international norms. It would be tragic and counterproductive if counter-terrorism became synonymous with lack of sensitivity to human rights and the due process of law. The future development of counter-terrorism policies must have stronger human rights safeguards built-in, in accordance with the relevant international instruments. Moreover, while there is an unquestionable need to confront terrorist groups with determination, it is equally imperative to strengthen cultural and religious

understanding in order to promote values of tolerance, respect and peaceful coexistence.

Preventing violent conflict

29. As part of our efforts to better understand the challenges of our time and devise strategies to address them more effectively, we must make even greater efforts to prevent the outbreak of violence well before internal tensions and conflicts have eroded polities and economies to the point of collapse.

30. The United Nations system has engaged in a comprehensive exercise to implement my report on the prevention of armed conflict (A/55/985-S/2001/574), and to better carry out its obligations to the peoples of the world. A number of initiatives have been launched in support of regional, subregional and national efforts to develop preventive strategies. General Assembly resolution 57/337 on the prevention of armed conflict, adopted by the Assembly on 3 July 2003, gives the United Nations a strong mandate not only to continue but also to expand and intensify its conflict prevention activities. It represents an encouraging sign of a shift in attitudes among Member States towards the recognition of the value of early warning and prevention of armed conflict. I intend to report more systematically on my efforts to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations in this area in the comprehensive report on prevention I shall submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session.

31. I would like to draw attention here to the need for effective measures to address the economic incentives that establish and maintain war economies. The Kimberley Process of diamond certification offers an example of how to reduce the scope of illicit transactions in precious stones and raw materials, which often fuel internal conflicts in resource-rich countries. We need further measures against money-laundering, which is often conducted through legal channels. The strategy of “naming and shaming” may in some cases be more effective than adopting resolutions or convening conferences. In addition, more efforts need to be made not only to punish actors involved in war economies but also to provide viable alternatives for economic activity. An effective international response will require addressing war economies at all stages of a peace process, from early warning and prevention to peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building. Globalization has provided new

opportunities to those who do wrong, but there is no reason why it should not also be exploited by international institutions intent on setting things right.

32. Happily, it is only a small proportion of the earth’s population that is directly and immediately threatened by war or large-scale conflict — although no part of the world should consider itself immune from such risks. The more immediate concern for most of our fellow human beings is with “soft threats” to their security, such as those posed by environmental problems, contagious diseases, economic dislocation, crime, domestic violence, oppressive or corrupt management at all levels (from the home and workplace to national institutions or multinational companies) and simple poverty, which makes people more vulnerable to threats of almost every kind.

33. Such threats, and the remedies for them, are dealt with in more detail in the following two chapters. Among them are often found the root causes of armed conflict, and for that reason they also merit discussion and action under the heading of conflict prevention. For instance, recent years have seen the development of a number of cooperative arrangements for the management of resources shared by more than one State, such as water, arrangements which have contributed to the general objective of preventing violent conflict. The potential impact of issues such as climate change and HIV/AIDS on international peace and security is also increasingly being recognized. However, the implications of the scarcity of a number of natural resources, the mismanagement or depletion of such resources and unequal access to them should also be recognized as potential causes of conflict and should be more systematically addressed as such by the international community.

Peacekeeping and peace-building

34. In the area of peace operations, the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, better known as the Brahimi report (A/55/305-S/2000/809), has provided a comprehensive analysis of peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building, which has enabled the United Nations and its Member States to improve their capacity in this field. Both the Security Council and the Secretariat are applying the lessons drawn from the experiences of the last decade. Better coordination and increased effectiveness have resulted in the successful implementation of complex

mandates in Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Kosovo and many other locations around the world.

35. Serious debate among Member States is required on the future of “robust” peacekeeping. There are certain instances where peace must first be established and the situation stabilized before a peacekeeping presence can be deployed. In such circumstances, the “Blue Helmets” are not the appropriate instrument. For these reasons I advised against their deployment in favour of multinational forces under the operational control of lead nations in Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Bunia, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and, most recently, Liberia.

36. Once a situation has stabilized, a robust United Nations peacekeeping mission can be a logical successor, provided that Member States with the capabilities required come forward to put their troops at the disposal of the Organization. It is unfortunate that those countries with strong military capacities that were most vocal in support of the recommendations of the Brahimi report have since been the most reluctant to contribute their forces to United Nations peacekeeping operations. The developing world has shouldered much of the burden in the interim, but it cannot do so indefinitely on its own. Perhaps the arrangements employed in the case of Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999 may serve as a workable model for the foreseeable future. The fact that core elements of the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) remained in theatre and re-hatted as “Blue Helmets” enabled a smooth transition to a robust and credible United Nations force, with units provided by both the developed and the developing world.

37. Narrowing the commitment gap on the military front is not the only challenge facing United Nations peacekeeping. Creative and concerted effort is also required to narrow the expectations gap. For example, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was established with limited strength, for the purpose of protecting the political mission tasked with helping to find a solution to the conflict, as well as to conduct disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of foreign armed groups. The danger in such cases is that, amidst widespread violence, expectations outrun both the capacity and the mandate of the force deployed. It is welcome that this year a multinational force led by France could be deployed in Bunia, in the north-eastern

part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in an interim capacity until such time as the United Nations can deploy a fully equipped force to create a secure environment.

38. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as in the majority of other conflict areas where United Nations peace operations are deployed, the constructive political and economic engagement of those countries with influence on the parties concerned is the element most critical to ensuring success. Without such political and economic support, the net effect of the military contributions is greatly diminished.

39. The United Nations has acquired considerable experience in assisting war-torn societies in their transition to peace. Timor-Leste has now taken its place among the States Members of the United Nations following the completion of the mandate of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which has been succeeded by a small support mission. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), once a Mission in crisis, has been reconfigured and strengthened and has provided effective assistance to the holding of democratic elections and the extension of the Government’s authority throughout the country. The Mission is now in the process of winding down. The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), established to reform the police force, has been successfully concluded, including the smooth transition to a smaller European Union police mission. These examples show that United Nations peace operations not only can succeed, but can do so within a set period of time and with a clear exit strategy.

40. When political breakthroughs occur, there is a need to act swiftly and surely to shore up nascent peace processes in the fragile transition from conflict. Collective action during such transition periods must be based on a clear adherence to the principles of restorative justice and civilian protection. In many cases, the United Nations assists in post-conflict peace-building in the absence of any military deployment. Through a range of efforts, often in partnership with other organizations, the United Nations provides good offices to keep peace processes on track, monitor elections, assist in the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and aid in the rehabilitation of war-torn economies. The main challenge always remains the establishment of new and durable state structures and the provision of external assistance in a way that

allows local societies to move most rapidly and effectively towards a sustainable peace.

41. It is important to understand that all these efforts are now taking place within a more globalized world. For peace to be sustainable in the early twenty-first century, a State emerging from armed conflict has to be able to meet the challenges of globalization. This may present an immense challenge for a post-conflict State. Unless coordinated efforts by such a State itself and the international community are made to succeed, such a State may well see its society fall prey, to its own detriment and also to that of the wider world, to global networks of organized crime and a host of other contemporary ills.

42. Even when apparently successful in repairing war-torn States, the international community can ill-afford to declare “victory” prematurely. The precarious nature of the peace today in Afghanistan stands as a reminder of how crucial it may be to dedicate even greater attention and effort in the second year of an operation, in order to consolidate the gains achieved in the first. The recent eruption of violence in Liberia and the coup d’état earlier this year in the Central African Republic — both countries where United Nations peacekeeping operations have been deployed previously — also illustrate the fragile nature of post-conflict environments and the importance of the international community staying the course during the post-peacekeeping phase.

43. Successes, setbacks and ongoing challenges make it essential that we better understand: first, what has worked and what has not, in order to identify ways in which we might improve our performance in the future; second, the transition from the period focused on emergency relief and peacemaking to one focused on reconciliation, rebuilding of national institutions and participation of affected populations; and third, the relationship between all forms of external assistance and the emergence of new and viable state structures.

Conclusion

44. Our collective record of achievement in implementing the commitments of the Millennium Declaration in the area of peace and security is decidedly mixed. If we are to do consistently better, we need to make greater efforts to produce innovative reforms, to be candid in evaluating existing

mechanisms and working methods and to engage in meaningful dialogues on the principles and practices that should guide us in the years ahead.

45. Above all, we must be intensely aware of the changes in the international security environment. The challenges to peace and security today are predominantly global. While they are not necessarily or entirely new, they take place in a new context and have far-reaching effects. They require complex and collective responses, which are possible only if the web of multilateral institutions is adequately developed and properly used. Cooperation across the globe is needed more than ever. Legitimacy of action, which may include military action, is essential to ensuring durable solutions to the security needs of our time. The Charter remains the indispensable basis for legitimate international action.

46. The world looks to the United Nations to address global security threats — irrespective of the part of the world from which they emanate or where their immediate impact is felt — with the global interest in mind. Therefore, we need a renewed commitment to work collectively, in accordance with the Charter. A collective security system built on fairness and consistency would be the best way to meet both old and new challenges.

III. Development

47. “We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people”. So reads the statement of the heads of State and Government of the United Nations in the Millennium Declaration. The world leaders identified global poverty as the most daunting of all the problems facing the world in the new century, one that they resolved to tackle by creating “an environment — at the national and global levels alike — which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty”. To help drive this effort, they included a series of clear, time-bound, development targets in the Declaration, targets which were subsequently consolidated as the Millennium Development Goals. The first seven Goals range from stemming the spread of HIV/AIDS to providing universal primary education, with the overarching aim of halving extreme poverty, all by the deadline of 2015. The eighth — “a global partnership for development” — comprises a set of commitments by

developed countries to support these efforts through increased aid, a non-discriminatory trading system and debt relief.

48. Three years on, the Millennium Development Goals have helped transform the framework for global development. As a set of measurable, shared objectives endorsed by all Member States, they have provided an unprecedented basis for partnership between developed and developing countries and have been embraced by other intergovernmental bodies, including the African Union and the Group of Eight. They have also allowed the United Nations system, the Bretton Woods institutions and other development partners to align their work around a common framework and to improve the coherence and effectiveness of all their efforts at country level. Within the United Nations system, we have also launched the “Millennium Development Goals campaign” to spread awareness and build global support for the Goals; a process of national reporting on progress towards the Goals, and the Millennium Project, which draws together hundreds of policy makers, practitioners and experts from across a wide range of institutions and countries to research how progress can be accelerated and sustained.

49. Rapid advances in some areas have shown that the Millennium Development Goals, while ambitious, can be reached at the global level. They are still achievable at the national level for nearly every country, even though progress towards them is at present very uneven, with wide variations across regions and countries, and even within countries. Growing political and financial support over the past year for key priorities, in particular for the fight against HIV/AIDS, clearly shows that resources *can* be mobilized very rapidly to meet specific global challenges if there is the political will. Nevertheless, it is evident that, following current trends, some parts of the world risk falling well short of achieving most of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015. With the global economy relatively weak, the scale of political and financial support for these less fortunate regions is currently well below the level needed to meet the Goals. Many developed countries are failing to meet key commitments, particularly in areas such as trade. There is therefore a clear need for political leaders to take urgent action over the coming year to avoid further setbacks and accelerate progress.

Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals

50. The Millennium Development Goals are outcomes rather than inputs. The Millennium Declaration explicitly recognizes the importance of factors not mentioned in the Goals themselves — such as good governance, the role of the private sector and civil society and the importance of “decent and productive work”, especially for young people — in achieving broader development. Nevertheless, while the Goals may not by themselves constitute a comprehensive development vision, they are a measurable set of human development benchmarks that can provide clear indications of whether the world is managing to build the more “inclusive and equitable” globalization called for in the Declaration. As the detailed statistical annex to the present report shows, the answer to that question remains unclear. For every Goal, there are encouraging signs of progress in some areas alongside worrying evidence of stagnation and reversal in others. The annex also shows that the capacity of countries to provide reliable statistics for monitoring trends needs to be considerably strengthened in order to provide sound measurements of their needs and achievements.

1. Extreme poverty and hunger

51. Progress towards most of the Millennium Development Goals depends heavily on equitable growth. A sustained and broad-based annual per capita income increase of 3 per cent is the minimum needed to lift people out of *poverty* at a rate sufficient to meet the Goal of reducing by half, by 2015, the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day. Global growth, however, has slipped since the Millennium Declaration was adopted, with developing countries bearing the brunt of the slowdown. Following an average increase of 2.8 per cent per annum in the 1990s, per capita output in the developing world rose only by 1.6 per cent annually in 2001-2003, with Latin America suffering an average *decline* of almost 1 per cent a year during the same period. In sub-Saharan Africa, the region where attaining the Goals presents the greatest challenge, annual average per capita growth of only 0.7 per cent was achieved in these three years. More encouragingly, however, the countries with economies in transition have reversed the decline they experienced in the 1990s. Most of them now seem likely to enjoy sound growth over the medium term.

52. Given that two thirds of the 1.2 billion people who struggle to survive on the equivalent of less than a dollar a day live in Asia, the chances of halving extreme poverty worldwide are overwhelmingly determined by the progress of China and India, the world's two most populous countries. With both countries broadly on track, the world has a good chance of meeting the 2015 deadline. At the national level, however, the picture is much more troubling, with 37 of the 67 countries for which data were available experiencing increased poverty rates in the 1990s. Nevertheless, it is still possible for most of these countries to meet the Goal. It is particularly encouraging that several sub-Saharan African nations, among them Cape Verde, Mauritius, Mozambique and Uganda, have been recording sustained growth above the 3 per cent per capita benchmark.

53. These regional and national variations are reflected in other targets as well. While most of the world made significant progress in the fight against *hunger* during the 1990s, it is unacceptable that during the same decade, in an era of global overproduction of food, the prevalence of underweight children remained high in parts of Asia, approaching 50 per cent in south-central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa — often as a result of structural causes such as long-term economic and agricultural policies, the low status of women, social inequities, poor governance and endemic conflict. With recent food shortages in southern and eastern Africa, those numbers are likely to have grown over the past year, although a full-scale humanitarian crisis has been averted through the efforts of the international community, led by the World Food Programme (WFP).

2. Universal primary education

54. Progress towards the Goal of universal primary education has been made in almost all regions — although the continuous slippage since 1990 in the high enrolment ratio in eastern Asia is cause for concern, as is the negligible increase in the chronically low levels of enrolment in sub-Saharan Africa, which is likely to leave that region, as a whole, far short of the target. Once again many countries provide dramatic evidence of what can be achieved in very short periods of time when they make the issue a priority and match commitment with sound policies and real resources. In the 1990s, Benin increased its primary enrolment rate and Mali its primary completion rate by more than 20 percentage points. Mauritania raised the ratio of girls to

boys in primary education from two thirds to over 90 per cent in a period of seven years. Malawi and Uganda also made considerable progress in the 1990s, as has Kenya in 2003. Region-wide progress on this scale would be a dramatic step in the right direction.

3. Gender equality and empowerment of women

55. While trends in gender equality in education and work are generally moving in the right direction, the overall improvement on a very low baseline is unacceptably slow in the area of political empowerment. These issues are examined in greater detail in chapter IV.

4. Child mortality

56. It is unacceptable that, in spite of broad advances in children's health in developing regions since 1990, nearly 11 million children still die each year before reaching their fifth birthday, mostly from easily preventable or treatable causes. In some regions there has been good progress towards the target of reducing this rate by two thirds by 2015, but in sub-Saharan Africa there was no significant progress between 1990 and 2001, and in south-central and western Asia, as in Oceania, progress is still too slow.

5. Maternal health

57. We cannot yet reliably measure trends in maternal mortality in developing countries over the last 15 years. What we can say is that in very few of those countries are there signs of progress sufficient to meet the target of reducing the rate by three quarters by 2015, and that differences between regions remain huge. Women are 175 times more likely to die in childbirth in sub-Saharan Africa, and 20 to 60 times more likely to suffer the same fate in Asia (except eastern Asia) and Oceania than in a developed country.

6. HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

58. Perhaps the greatest cause for concern has been the lack of progress made to reverse the rate of the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. HIV/AIDS is now the deadliest pandemic in human history. As detailed in my report on progress towards the implementation of the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS (A/58/184), it has already had a devastating social and economic impact in sub-Saharan Africa and, to a lesser extent, the Caribbean. Infection

rates in most countries of south-central and south-eastern Asia are already at least comparable to those in most developed countries, where the pandemic started much earlier, and there are signs that the disease is breaking out of high-risk pockets into the general population. The incidence of malaria may also be rising, as increasing resistance of the infection to available drugs, and of mosquitoes to available pesticides, makes both treatment and prevention more difficult. The best estimates available also indicate that the incidence of tuberculosis is increasing.

59. Here again, however, rapid improvements are possible if we learn from and build on success stories. In Thailand, for example, a strong prevention campaign since 1990 has broadly contained the pandemic; Uganda reduced HIV/AIDS infection rates for eight consecutive years in the 1990s; and Zambia may soon become the second African country to reduce the rate of the spread of the disease from crisis levels. Senegal and Cambodia also succeeded in containing the spread of HIV. Moreover, countries have the chance to make sizeable inroads into the incidence of tuberculosis by adopting a relatively inexpensive but sustained programme of treatment.

60. These efforts are now being supported by a major global mobilization, combining new commitments to advocacy and political action in many of the most affected countries and a new drive to raise international resources commensurate with the scale of the challenge. I have made this issue my highest personal priority and, as patron of the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, have been encouraged by the increase in support both for that body and for broader efforts by United Nations agencies, the World Bank and others. Private foundations are also increasingly providing support for research, treatment and prevention, while some pharmaceutical firms are now offering steeply discounted drug supplies and an increasing number of countries are able to provide inexpensive generic drugs to their populations. Nevertheless, with commitments for the Global Fund still significantly short of the \$3 billion required in 2004 — let alone the \$4.5 billion needed in 2005 — it is imperative that donors make a renewed effort to increase their support to address this unique challenge. If we take action now, we can still reasonably hope to meet the deadline of 2015 for halting and beginning to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and the incidence of malaria and other

major diseases. If we wait longer, the cost will continue to be counted in millions of lives.

7. Environmental sustainability

61. The goal of ensuring environmental sustainability has also seen both success and failure. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer has demonstrated the effectiveness of concerted multilateral action, resulting in a large decrease in global consumption of chlorofluorocarbons, mostly in the developed countries (formerly the overwhelmingly dominant users of these gases). The consumption of these gases by developing countries has also declined by about half since 1995. In other areas, however, progress has been less encouraging. For example, one consequence of population growth, urbanization, farming and the strong demand for high quality hardwood has been the decline in the proportion of land area covered by forests. In developing regions, this proportion declined from 28.1 per cent in 1990 to 26.8 per cent in 2000. In response to such challenges, the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002, had some success in refocusing global attention on these critical issues, while more clearly linking environmental sustainability to poverty reduction. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation explicitly commits the signatories to responsible and equitable management of the earth's resources as part of the broader effort to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. It also highlights the critical role of the private sector and public-private partnerships in addressing key environmental challenges ranging from biodiversity protection to renewable energy. Many of these partnerships are now being put into practice, providing models for future action. In May 2003, the Commission on Sustainable Development agreed on structures and processes for fostering the implementation of the outcome of the World Summit and the partnerships under review.

Progress towards Goal 8: building a global partnership for development

62. The most important components of Goal 8 relate to trade, debt relief and aid. It is no exaggeration to state that the success or failure of all the Millennium Development Goals hinges on whether developed countries meet their commitments in these areas. They should be encouraged, working through the

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or other forums, to agree on time-bound deadlines for these pledges comparable to the 2015 target for the first seven Millennium Goals.

63. On the issue of **trade**, a critical step towards the fulfilment of Goal 8 came in November 2001 with the agreements at the Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Doha, which placed the needs and interests of the developing countries at the heart of the WTO trade negotiations. There has been some progress on critical issues such as access to medicines and agriculture in the run-up to the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancún, Mexico, in September 2003. Agreement has been reached on a mechanism to give developing countries that cannot produce cheap, generic drugs the right to import them from countries that can. We must now ensure that the developing countries are given the support they need to make use of the mechanisms that have been agreed upon, so that the drugs can reach the millions who are suffering and dying.

64. Moving the trade agenda forward and addressing key developing country concerns is an indispensable and urgently needed step towards more equitable globalization. In 2001 both the United States of America, with its Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, and the European Union, with its “Everything but Arms” initiative, recognized the importance of expanded trading opportunities for development in the poorest countries. However, a more comprehensive multilateral agreement is vitally needed. In particular, developed countries must agree to provide substantial improvements in market access by reducing or eliminating the high tariffs and non-tariff barriers they currently maintain on many developing-country exports, as well as phasing out the more than \$300 billion a year they currently spend on agricultural subsidies, thereby denying farmers in poor countries a fair chance to compete, whether in world markets or at home.

65. Without such a comprehensive agreement, developing countries will have little chance of generating higher economic growth.

66. Continued progress in the area of **debt relief** has been made over the past year. Twenty-six countries have now reached their decision point under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. However, only eight countries had reached

completion point by mid-2003, compared with a target of 19. The positive experience of Uganda in using debt relief proceeds to expand primary education, which has a direct, measurable impact on a country’s capacity to meet the Millennium Development Goals, shows how important it is to accelerate and widen this initiative. Unfortunately, steep declines in commodity prices have undercut progress in the field of HIPC in recent years, creating a need for extra “topping up”, that is, additional debt relief after completion point to keep debt-to-export ratios below 150 per cent. Further consideration also needs to be given to debt between heavily indebted poor countries, debt owed to non-Paris Club bilateral creditors and finding ways to resolve debt crises of countries not eligible for HIPC, so that the burden is more equitably shared between the debtor country and its creditors.

67. Finally, on the issue of **finance and assistance for development**, significant progress was made at the International Conference on Financing for Development, held at Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002. The Monterrey Consensus adopted there built on the Millennium Declaration and explicitly laid out a new framework of mutual obligations and mutual accountability between developed and developing countries. It reaffirmed the developing countries’ full acceptance of their responsibility for their own development, while stressing the critical importance of support from the developed countries.

68. As part of the commitments made at Monterrey, all parties agreed on the importance of the “ownership” of developing countries of their national development strategies. For the poorest countries these strategies include Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which form the basis for assistance from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donors, including the United Nations system. Tailored Millennium Development Goal targets can form the longer-term development objectives of such shorter-term action plans. Domestic resources will remain the primary driving force for development. Governments of developing countries and countries with economies in transition should therefore redouble their efforts to increase the resources spent on development and ensure that they are used effectively. To this end, many developing countries will need to improve their structures of governance and public administration.

69. However, as the High-Level Panel on Financing for Development that I assembled under the leadership

of the former President of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, concluded in its report (see A/55/1000, annex), even assuming developing countries adopt sound policies and maximize use of domestic resources, an additional \$50 billion a year in aid is likely to be needed, as a minimum, in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

70. After the International Conference on Financing for Development, official development assistance (ODA) began to climb again in 2002, after nearly a decade of decline. OECD calculations show stated commitments of an additional \$16 billion by 2006. In addition, some very promising proposals for raising the balance of the additional \$50 billion have been put forward — notably the International Finance Facility, which deserves serious consideration. Sadly, the global economic slowdown and domestic budget pressures have already led some donor Governments to start backing away from their pledges, a shift which would be enormously damaging to prospects for meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Not only should donors make every effort to meet their existing commitments, but also those that have not yet done so should continue to *increase* aid until they reach the level of 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) reaffirmed, at both Monterrey and Johannesburg, as the desired level of international assistance for rich countries. Even doubling existing aid flows would only bring total donor assistance to a level around 0.44 per cent of GNI — roughly back to the level of the 1960s.

71. More broadly, success in all these efforts depends on progress in meeting the Declaration's commitment to "good governance at the international level". In this context, it remains a matter of serious concern that developing countries are not given sufficient say in the decision-making process of many key international organizations — not only the United Nations but also WTO, IMF and the World Bank. Unless developing countries enjoy — and are seen by the global public to enjoy — greater access to, and voice in, institutions whose policies have a profound impact on the lives of their citizens, the public hostility to globalization reflected in frequent international protests since the Ministerial Meeting of WTO in Seattle in November 1999 will continue to grow.

Conclusion

72. For the first time in human history, we have the resources, the knowledge and the expertise to eradicate human poverty — and to do it within the lifetime of a child born at the time when the Millennium Declaration was adopted. Reaching the Millennium Development Goals, which are an essential part of the Declaration, would be a critical step towards achieving that end. The Goals are thus the best hope for the world's poor. They can be reached if, during the 12 years we still have before 2015, we maintain and increase the momentum that has been generated during the first three years of the new century.

IV. Human rights, democracy and good governance

73. None of the pledges dealt with in the previous chapters of this report are likely to be realized unless the effort to achieve them is firmly based, at both the national and the global levels, on the common values reaffirmed in the Millennium Declaration, namely: freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility. This gives particular importance to the pledges made in chapter V of the Declaration, relating to human rights, democracy and good governance.

74. In these areas, too, the international climate has been significantly changed by the attacks of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath. On that day, thousands of human beings were brutally deprived of the most fundamental of all human rights, the right to life, by a premeditated act of terror, which many have called a crime against humanity. That abominable act expressed a state of mind in which human rights cease to have any meaning for those prepared to use any means, no matter how callous, cruel or destructive, to achieve their political objective.

75. The struggle against terrorism may also have a very important secondary effect: in fighting *against* it, we run the risk of sacrificing a great deal in terms of human rights, democracy and good governance. Tolerance is too often the first casualty of a "war on terror", which is widely perceived, especially by Muslims, as a war against Islam. To go down that path would hand the terrorists a victory beyond their dreams.

76. Nothing can excuse terrorism, but it often feeds on alienation and despair. If human beings everywhere were given real *hope* of achieving self-respect and a decent life by peaceful methods, terrorists would become harder to recruit and would receive less sympathy and support from society at large. Greater respect for human rights, along with democracy and social justice, will, in the long term, be the most effective prophylactic against terror. Suppression of peaceful dissent is never an effective way for a State to strengthen itself, since truly strong States derive their strength from the freely given consent of the governed.

International protection of human rights

77. On the positive side, the last 12 months have seen accelerated progress towards universal ratification of the six major human rights treaties. The seventh treaty, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, has now entered into force — an important milestone for economic and social rights. In addition, the adoption of an optional protocol to the Convention against Torture, allowing prison inspections, reflects the international community's continued determination to increase protections in this area. The inauguration of the judges and prosecutor of the International Criminal Court is another significant step towards the elimination of impunity for the gravest human rights violations. It is important to note that, thanks to the Rome Statute, which made this the first international court with specific rules for fair balance between women and men, seven of the judges are women.

78. Within the United Nations system, both the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights have intensified their assistance to States that request help in promoting good governance and strengthening their national human rights protection systems. The human rights components of United Nations peace missions have helped create a more favourable environment for peace and development efforts in societies emerging from conflict. Such actions have most recently started to be taken up in Iraq and Côte d'Ivoire. The Commission on Human Rights, for its part, has continued the process, begun in 1999, of reconsidering and strengthening its methods of work. It is to be hoped that this process will

soon culminate in the adoption of concrete measures, aimed at reducing the level of politicization within the Commission. Such measures are sorely needed. In the past year divisions and disputes have weakened the Commission's authority and its voice in the great debates about human rights has been muffled. Member States should appreciate that membership of the Commission implies responsibilities as well as privileges.

79. Meanwhile, in the actual practice of promoting democracy and strengthening the rule of law, "as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development", to use the actual words of the Millennium Declaration, one is forced to admit that there are still enormous gaps to be filled.

Women's rights

80. Women, in particular, continue to face varying degrees of discrimination in almost all parts of the world. Virtually nowhere are their rights given the priority they deserve, with the result, *inter alia*, that women are unable to play their vital role in helping their societies to build peace and cope with hardship. The best one can say is that there is increased global awareness of issues affecting women's rights, although at the country level, there is little progress and in many cases even the rights that have been achieved are under threat.

81. Despite the now wide recognition of the impact of war and its aftermath on women and girls, particularly in relation to sexual violence, and of the need to include women in peace-building, rape and sexual violence continue to be used as weapons of war and women continue to be excluded from almost all peace negotiations. Indeed, in today's conflicts, women and girls are more and more often directly targeted. Clearly, this differential impact of conflict on women and girls calls for more effective responses from the international community. Much more needs to be done to make those involved in conflicts aware of relevant international laws and to punish those who violate them. By the same token, human rights and gender equality need to be given greater emphasis in reconstruction and peace-building efforts, with a view to creating more equitable and sustainable societies.

82. Another area of grave concern is the increasingly widespread practice of *trafficking* in women and girls, one of the fastest-growing types of organized crime. It has been estimated that more than 700,000 people are trafficked each year for sexual exploitation. Many of the victims are subjected to violence. This is clearly a major human rights challenge for the new millennium. Strategies to counter it need to address the many factors that at present foster a favourable environment for trafficking, including gender-based violence, cultural practices and social structures that promote the demand for and the commercialization of women's and children's bodies and the denial of equal status for women in access to property and the attainment of economic independence.

83. A higher priority for such strategies would be one of many benefits humanity could derive from the full inclusion of women in political decision-making and governance. As things stand, women in many parts of the world continue to be excluded from decision-making at all levels of government, or are given only token representation. Currently there are only 12 women serving as elected heads of State or Government, five women Vice-Presidents and four women leaders of the main opposition in their countries. The proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments stands at 15.1 per cent, representing a small increase of 0.6 per cent since 2002 and an increase of just under 2 per cent since 1990. This aggregate figure masks wide regional and subregional variations — from 40 per cent in the Nordic countries to 5.6 per cent in Western Asia. There is little systematic data on women's representation at lower levels of government and in economic decision-making bodies, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the situation there is not much better. At all levels, specific support is needed to ensure that women can participate effectively.

Democracy

84. Democracy and human rights, though distinct concepts, are closely interlinked. Democracy, as a human right in itself, is implied in article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but it only functions in its fullest sense when other human rights are respected. It is therefore hardly surprising that worldwide acceptance of democracy as a norm more or less kept pace with the wider acceptance of universal

human rights standards during the decade that followed the end of the Cold War. In many countries, however, the transition to democracy has been accompanied by serious social and economic problems.

85. Recent experience in several countries shows that democratic processes can suffer setbacks when democracies fall short of their citizens' expectations, particularly in delivering development and alleviating poverty. Such situations can create tensions, sometimes leading to armed conflicts. In addition, there are still countries where resistance to democracy is strong, even though the majority of the people clearly desire change. Zimbabwe and Myanmar are cases in point.

86. Although primarily home-grown, democracy can benefit from international help. The international community can respond to the special needs of democratization processes in post-conflict situations, where the United Nations has developed rich experience, and in other politically fragile circumstances. It can also provide electoral assistance, as the United Nations has done over the years in 89 countries and expects to do in others, including Afghanistan and Iraq.

Conclusion

87. Human rights are universal principles, but, inspiring as those principles are, none implement themselves. Good governance, effective institutions, adequate material resources and international support are usually what make the difference between noble aspirations and effective realization.

88. Many countries are failing to meet the challenges of poverty, conflict and HIV/AIDS for lack of robust and imaginative governance. Yet in some countries, especially in Africa, efforts to improve governance have been thwarted by the decimation of an entire generation through HIV/AIDS. Persistent gender inequality aggravates all these problems and restricts efforts to find solutions. The role of gender inequality in the continued spread of HIV is more and more widely acknowledged in global and national policy discussions, as is the importance of empowering women if efforts to reverse the spread are to succeed. Governments have yet to translate this recognition into the commitment of sufficient resources or effective implementation.

89. It is by now almost a truism that elections are not isolated events but part of a holistic process, and that sustainable democracy must be rooted in stable institutions and a strong civil society in which the rights of minorities as well as those of majorities are protected by the rule of law. Even ostensibly democratic political processes are often marred by limited public participation, restricted or manipulated information and controlled or censored media.

90. It should be no less obvious, although the situation in Iraq may now remind us, that to be both meaningful and effective, human rights, good governance and democracy must be embraced as their own by the people of the society concerned. It is within each country that they must be made to work. However, the United Nations and the international community can provide support and help create the conditions for success. In some cases, the role of such international contributions may be decisive.

V. Conclusion: reinforcing multilateral institutions

91. Throughout this report, the leitmotiv has been the need for stronger international solidarity and responsibility, together with greater respect for decisions reached collectively and greater determination to put them into effect. The question that inevitably arises is whether it is sufficient to exhort States and individuals to more enlightened attitudes and greater efforts, or whether a radical reform of our international institutions is also needed. My own view is that Member States need at least to take a hard look at the existing “architecture” of international institutions and to ask themselves whether it is adequate for the tasks we have before us.

92. The General Assembly is well aware of the efforts that I have made since 1997 to make the United Nations more effective, as an Organization, in carrying out the mandates entrusted to it by its Members and to adapt its internal structures and its culture to new expectations and new challenges. Thanks to the support of Member States, I believe these reforms have not been without effect. The United Nations has been in the forefront of the battle to eradicate poverty and fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The implementation of the Brahimi report has improved our capacity to deploy and manage peacekeeping and peace-building

operations and the Organization has responded well, by and large, to unexpected challenges in Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. Overall the system shows greater coherence and its disparate elements work better together. Fruitful partnerships have been built with a wide range of non-state actors. In short, the United Nations is evolving with the times. It is more efficient, more transparent and more creative.

93. Last year I placed a second set of reform proposals before the General Assembly, which gave them, I am glad to say, a general endorsement. I believe that we now need to go beyond those useful but essentially managerial changes and to pose some more fundamental questions, not just about the way decisions are implemented, but about the adequacy or efficiency of the bodies whose task it is to take those decisions.

94. There should be no shame or embarrassment about asking such questions. Our Organization, which began with 51 members, now has 191. It would be surprising if such an increase, welcome as it is, particularly in that it reflects the enfranchisement of the developing world, did *not* put a strain on the machinery and require us to think about ways to adapt and improve it.

95. In the General Assembly, where all States are represented on a basis of sovereign equality, their sheer number has helped produce an agenda crowded with items that either overlap or are of interest to only a few States. Repetitive and sterile debates crowd out the items that really matter. Decisions can often be reached only on a lowest-common-denominator basis and, once reached, command little or no attention beyond the confines of the General Assembly Chamber.

96. In the Security Council and the international financial institutions, the problem is rather the opposite: decisions may be reached, and in some cases may have a decisive impact on events in the real world. Increasingly, however, those decisions lack legitimacy in the eyes of the developing world, which feels that its views and interests are insufficiently represented among the decision-takers. The composition of the Security Council — unchanged in its essentials since 1945 — seems at odds with the geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century.

97. I believe these challenges are not insuperable, but institutional reforms may well be needed if they are to

be overcome. I have already appointed a high-level panel to review the whole range of relations between the United Nations and global civil society. The essential counterpart must be a review of the principal organs of the Organization itself — their effectiveness, their coherence, and the balance of roles and responsibilities between them. The General Assembly needs to be strengthened; the role of the Economic and Social Council — indeed the role of the United Nations as a whole in economic and social affairs, and its relationship to the Bretton Woods institutions — needs to be re-thought and reinvigorated; the role of the Trusteeship Council needs to be reviewed in the light of new kinds of responsibility given to the United Nations by its Member States in recent years; and the Security Council needs to be reformed in a way that will enable it to confront the changing nature of conflict and the new challenges to peace and security that I have described.

98. Such reforms have been discussed for many years. I believe we can afford to delay them no longer. I suggest that every Member State should consider reaching swift agreement on them as a national interest of the highest order.

99. I am glad that the General Assembly has decided to review, in 2005, the progress achieved in implementing all the commitments made in the Millennium Declaration, on the basis of a comprehensive report from the Secretary-General, and I particularly welcome its observation, in the final paragraph of its recently adopted resolution 57/270 B, that there is scope for making this review a “major event”. Member States may wish to take that date as a deadline for reaching agreement on the changes that are needed in our international institutions if they are to meet the new challenges outlined in the present report.

Annex

Millennium Development Goals: targets and indicators

Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Target 1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day

1. Population below \$1 purchasing power parity (PPP) per day^{a,b}

	(Percentage)	
	1990	1999
All low-income and middle-income countries	29.6	23.2
Transition countries in Europe	1.2	3.8
Northern Africa	2.4	1.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	47.4	49.0
Latin America and the Caribbean	11.0	11.1
Eastern Asia and Oceania	32.9	17.8
South-central Asia	41.2	32.6
South-eastern Asia	23.6	11.0
Western Asia	2.2	7.5

2. Poverty gap ratio

The annex to the Secretary-General's previous annual report (A/57/270) presented World Bank estimates based on country data available at that time. No new estimates for these indicators are available for the present report.

3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption

The annex to the Secretary-General's previous annual report (A/57/270) presented World Bank estimates based on country data available at that time. No new estimates for these indicators are available for the present report.

Target 2. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

4. Children under five years of age who are underweight^b

	(Percentage)	
	1990	2000
Developing regions	33	28
Northern Africa	10	9
Sub-Saharan Africa	30	31
Latin America and the Caribbean	11	8
Eastern Asia	19	11
South-central Asia	53	47
South-eastern Asia	38	29
Western Asia	14	18

5. Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption^b

	(Percentage)	
	1990	2000
Northern Africa	5	5
Sub-Saharan Africa	35	33
Latin America and the Caribbean	13	11
Eastern Asia	16	10
South-central Asia	25	24
South-eastern Asia	17	12
Western Asia	7	10
Oceania	25	27
Least developed countries	37	38
Landlocked developing countries	n.a.	33
Small island developing States	25	25

Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education

Target 3. Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education^b

	(Primary-level enrollees per 100 children of enrolment age)	
	1990-1991	2000-2001
World	81.9	83.6
Developed regions	94.9	95.6
Countries in transition	88.2	90.6
Developing regions	79.8	82.1
Northern Africa	82.6	91.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	54.5	57.7
Latin America and the Caribbean	86.9	96.6
Eastern Asia	97.7	93.5
South-central Asia	73.1	79.2
South-eastern Asia	92.6	91.5
Western Asia	81.8	85.1
Oceania	76.0	82.9
Landlocked developing countries	53.6	60.5

7. Pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5

Due to limited data availability at the country level, this series cannot reliably be estimated at the regional level.

8. Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds^b

	(Percentage)	
	1990	2000
World	84.2	86.8
Developed regions	99.6	99.7
Developing regions	81.1	84.4
Northern Africa	66.3	76.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	66.5	76.4
Latin America	93.4	95.7
Caribbean	86.1	87.1
Eastern Asia	95.4	97.7
South-central Asia	63.0	70.8
South-eastern Asia	94.3	96.3
Western Asia	81.6	85.9
Oceania	77.3	82.0
Least developed countries	54.4	63.6
Landlocked developing countries	65.8	72.3
Small island developing States	85.0	85.6

Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women**Target 4. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels of education no later than 2015**

9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education

Primary level^b

	(Ratio of girls to boys)	
	1990-1991	2000-2001
Developed regions	0.95	0.95
Developing regions	0.83	0.87
Northern Africa	0.79	0.88
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.82	0.87
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.95	0.94
Eastern Asia	0.86	0.92
South-central Asia	0.72	0.79
South-eastern Asia	0.94	0.94
Western Asia	0.82	0.85
Oceania	0.84	0.85

Secondary education^c

	(Ratio of girls to boys)	
	1990	1998
Developed regions	0.98	0.99
Developing regions	0.72	0.82
Northern Africa	0.76	0.90
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.75	0.82
Latin America and the Caribbean	1.06	1.06
Eastern Asia	0.73	0.82
South-central Asia	0.59	0.68
South-eastern Asia	0.87	0.93
Western Asia	0.69	0.74
Oceania	1.00	0.94

Tertiary education^c

	(Ratio of girls to boys)	
	1990	1998
Developed regions	1.05	1.12
Developing regions	0.66	0.75
Northern Africa	0.52	0.72
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.47	0.63
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.94	1.02
Eastern Asia	0.49	0.51
South-central Asia	0.54	0.58
South-eastern Asia	0.82	1.11
Western Asia	0.66	1.10
Oceania	0.82	0.63

10. Ratio of literate women to men, 15-24 year-olds

	(Female literacy rates as ratio to male literacy rates)	
	1990	2000
Developed regions	1.00	1.00
Developing regions	0.89	0.91
Northern Africa	0.73	0.84
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.79	0.88
Latin America and the Caribbean	1.00	1.01
Eastern Asia	0.96	0.98
South-central Asia	0.74	0.80
South-eastern Asia	0.97	0.99
Western Asia	0.83	0.88
Oceania	0.90	0.93
Least developed countries	0.70	0.78
Landlocked developing countries	0.80	0.85
Small island developing States	0.99	0.99

11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector^{b,d}

	(Percentage)	
	1990	2000
Developed regions	41.6	44.0
Countries in transition	48.9	48.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	18.9	28.6
Middle East and North Africa	25.1	21.2
Latin America and the Caribbean	38.0	42.4
Asia and the Pacific	29.3	31.1

12. Seats held by women in national parliaments

	(Percentage)		
	1990	2000	2003
World	13.2	13.5	15.1
Developed regions	16.2	16.7	18.6
Nordic countries ^e	33.9	38.9	39.9
Countries in transition	24.8	9.5	12.5
Developing regions	11.5	11.9	13.5
Northern Africa	2.6	3.3	6.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.2	10.6	13.2
Latin America and the Caribbean	11.9	15.2	17.7
Eastern Asia	20.2	19.9	20.2
South-central Asia	6.2	6.9	8.9
South-eastern Asia	10.4	14.6	15.0
Western Asia	10.1	5.3	5.6
Oceania	1.2	3.9	2.6
Least developed countries	8.0	7.5	11.1
Landlocked developing countries	14.7	7.8	11.4
Small island developing States	15.1	14.9	17.1

Goal 4. Reduce child mortality**Target 5. Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate**13. Under-five mortality rate^b

	(Deaths per 1,000 live births)	
	1990	2000
World	92	82
Developed regions	13	9
Developing regions	102	90
Northern Africa	88	43
Sub-Saharan Africa	176	172
Latin America and the Caribbean	54	36
Eastern Asia	44	36
South-central Asia	125	95
South-eastern Asia	77	51
Western Asia	70	62
Oceania	85	76

14. Infant mortality rate

The annex to the Secretary-General's previous annual report (A/57/270) presented UNICEF/WHO estimates based on country data available at that time. No new estimates are available for the present report.

15. 1-year-old children immunized against measles^b

	(Percentage)	
	1990	2001
World	73	72
Developed regions	83	91
Developing regions	72	70
Northern Africa	85	93
Sub-Saharan Africa	57	58
Latin America and the Caribbean	77	91
Eastern Asia	98	79
South-central Asia	59	61
South-eastern Asia	72	73
Western Asia	80	90
Oceania	69	64

Goal 5. Improve maternal health**Target 6. Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio**16. Maternal mortality ratio^f

	(Maternal deaths per 100,000 live births) 2000
World	400
Developed regions	20
Developing regions	440
Northern Africa	130
Sub-Saharan Africa	920
Latin America and the Caribbean	190
Eastern Asia	55
South-central Asia	520
South-eastern Asia	210
Western Asia	190
Oceania	240

17. Births attended by a skilled attendant^b

	(Percentage)	
	1990	2000
Developing regions	42	52
Northern Africa	39	64
Sub-Saharan Africa	40	43
Latin America and the Caribbean	76	85
Eastern Asia	53	72
South-central Asia	27	35
South-eastern Asia	36	59
Western Asia	59	64

Goal 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases**Target 7. Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS**18. Adults aged 15-49 living with HIV/AIDS, both sexes^{g,h}

	(Percentage) 2002
World	1.2
Developed regions	0.5
Developing regions	1.4
Northern Africa	<0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	8.5
Latin America	0.6
Caribbean	2.4
Eastern Asia	0.2
South-central Asia	0.5
South-eastern Asia	0.5
Western Asia	<0.1
Oceania	0.6

19. Condom use

(a) Women 15-24 reporting the use of condom during sexual intercourse with a non-regular partner in the past 12 monthsⁱ

	(Percentage) 1996-2001^j
Sub-Saharan Africa	21
Latin America and the Caribbean	36
South-central Asia	40

(b) Population aged 15-24 with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDSⁱ

	Women 15-24 who know that a healthy looking person can be infected with HIV/AIDS (Percentage) 1996-2001ⁱ	Women 15-24 who know that a condom can prevent the transmission of HIV (Percentage) 1996-2001^j
Sub-Saharan Africa	51	49
Latin America and the Caribbean	77	-
South-central Asia	-	60
South-eastern Asia	47	38

20. Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14ⁱ

1996-2001^j

Africa (38 countries) 0.85

Target 8. Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

21. Deaths associated with malaria^{b,h}

(Children 0-4 years
per 100,000)

2000

World	148
Developed regions	0
Developing regions	166
Northern Africa	47
Sub-Saharan Africa	791
Latin America and the Caribbean	1
Eastern Asia	0
South-central Asia	6
South-eastern Asia	2
Western Asia	26
Oceania	2

22. Population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures

(a) Prevention — children under 5 who sleep under insecticide-treated bednets^{b,h}

(Percentage)

2000

Africa (countries with data available) 2

(b) Treatment — children under 5 with fever who are appropriately treated

In the majority of African countries for which data are available, at least 50 per cent of children under five years with recent fever are treated with anti-malarial drugs.

23. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis
(Per 100,000 population)

(a) Prevalence^{b,h}

	2001
World	120
Developed regions	23
Countries in transition	66
Developing regions	144
Northern Africa	27
Sub-Saharan Africa	197
Latin America and the Caribbean	41
Eastern Asia	184
South-central Asia	218
South-eastern Asia	108
Western Asia	40
Oceania	215

(b) Deaths^{b,h}

	2001
World	26
Developed regions	5
Countries in transition	16
Developing regions	31
Northern Africa	5
Sub-Saharan Africa	46
Latin America and the Caribbean	9
Eastern Asia	40
South-central Asia	47
South-eastern Asia	21
Western Asia	9
Oceania	36

24. Tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment
short course (DOTS)

(a) New cases detected under DOTS^{b,k}

	(Percentage)	
	1995	2001
World	11	33

(b) DOTS cases successfully treated^{b,k}

	(Percentage)	
	1995	2000
World	77	82

Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability**Target 9. Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources**

25. Proportion of land area covered by forest

	(Percentage)	
	1990	2000
World	30.4	29.7
Developed regions	34.2	34.4
Countries in transition	40.2	40.6
Developing regions	28.1	26.8
Northern Africa	1.0	1.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	29.3	27.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	50.1	47.8
Eastern Asia	15.4	17.0
South-central Asia	10.0	10.2
South-eastern Asia	53.9	48.6
Western Asia	3.9	4.0
Oceania	67.3	65.0
Least developed countries	29.4	27.2
Landlocked developing countries	17.6	16.4
Small island developing States	50.7	49.2

26. Area protected to maintain biological diversity

	(Percentage of surface area)	
	1990	2003
Developed regions	8.6	10.5
Northern Africa	3.3	3.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	8.2	8.5
Latin America and the Caribbean	7.2	9.9
Eastern Asia	6.3	7.6
South-central Asia	3.4	3.7
South-eastern Asia	3.7	5.4
Western Asia	3.4	16.5 ¹
Oceania	2.1	2.3

27. Energy use

(Consumption of kilogram oil equivalent per \$1,000 gross domestic product (PPP))^m

	1990	2000
High-income economies	265	204
Low and middle-income economies	325	249
Sub-Saharan Africa	401	341
Middle East and Northern Africa	281	263
Latin America and the Caribbean	203	164
Southern Asia	257	181

28. Carbon dioxide emissions and consumption of ozone-depleting chloroflourocarbons (CFCs)

(a) Carbon dioxide emissions^k

(Metric tons of carbon per capita)

	1990	1999
World	1.16	1.10

(b) Ozone-depleting CFCs^k

(Thousands of metric tons of ozone-depleting potential (ODP))

	1990	1999
World	1 063	120
Developed regions	925	25
Developing regions	138	120

29. Population using solid fuels^{b,n}

(Percentage of households)

	1990	2000
Developing regions	75	75
Northern Africa and the Middle East	46	40
Sub-Saharan Africa	82	79
Asia	80	79

Target 10. Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation

30. Sustainable access to an improved water source^b

		(Percentage of population)			
		1990		2000	
		Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
World		94	64	95	71
	Developed regions	n.a.	n.a.	100	94
	Developing regions	92	60	92	69
	Northern Africa	94	80	95	83
	Sub-Saharan Africa	86	40	83	45
	Latin America and the Caribbean	92	58	94	66
	Eastern Asia	99	60	94	66
	South-central Asia	90	66	95	80
	South-eastern Asia	91	64	91	71
	Western Asia	n.a.	n.a.	88	71
	Oceania	88	32	76	40

31. Access to improved sanitation^{b,o}

		(Percentage of population)			
		1990		2000	
		Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
World		81	28	85	40
	Developed regions	n.a.	n.a.	100	93
	Developing regions	70	21	77	35
	Northern Africa	94	64	96	81
	Sub-Saharan Africa	75	46	74	43
	Latin America and the Caribbean	85	41	86	52
	Eastern Asia	56	2	70	27
	South-central Asia	52	11	70	25
	South-eastern Asia	73	44	80	55
	Western Asia	95	58	97	61
	Oceania	92	80	87	71

Target 11. By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

32. Households with access to secure tenure^f

	Urban slum population 2001	
	(Millions)	(Percentage)
World	924	31.6
Developed regions	54	6.0
Developing regions	870	43.0
Northern Africa	21	28.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	166	71.9
Latin America and the Caribbean	128	31.9
Eastern Asia	194	36.4
Eastern Asia excluding China	16	25.4
South-central Asia	262	58.0
South-eastern Asia	57	28.0
Western Asia	41	33.1
Oceania	0	24.1
Least developed countries	140	78.2
Landlocked developing countries	47	56.5
Small island developing States	7	24.4

Goal 8. Develop a global partnership for development

Target 12. Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system

Includes: a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction — both nationally and internationally

Target 13. Address the special needs of the least developed countries

Includes: tariff and quota free access for the least developed countries' exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance (ODA) for countries committed to poverty reduction

Target 14. Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly)

Target 15. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term

33. Net ODA, total and to least developed countries

(a) Annual total assistance

	(US\$ billions)		
	1990	2001	2002
To all developing countries	53.0	52.3	57.0
To least developed countries	14.4	11.8	n.a.

(b) Share of OECD/DAC donors' gross national income

	(Percentage)		
	1990	2001	2002
To all developing countries	0.33	0.22	0.23
To least developed countries	0.09	0.05	n.a.

34. Bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)^b

	(Percentage)	
	1996-1997	2000-2001
	9	15

35. Untied bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors^b

	(Percentage)	
	1990	2001
	67.6	79.1

36. ODA received by landlocked countries^b

	(Percentage of recipients' GNIs)	
	1990	2001
	6.0	6.4

37. ODA received by small island developing States^b

	(Percentage of recipients' GNIs)	
	1990	2001
	2.6	0.9

38. Developed country imports from developing countries admitted free of duty^b

	(Percentage of value)		
	1996	2000	2001
(a) Excluding arms			
Developing countries	54.8	62.8	65.7
Least developed countries	71.5	75.4	75.3
(b) Excluding arms and oil			
Developing countries	56.8	65.1	66.0
Least developed countries	81.1	70.5	69.1

39. Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries^b

	(Percentage)		
	1996	2000	2001
(a) Agriculture			
Developing countries	10.5	10.6	10.1
Least developed countries	6.3	5.3	3.2
(b) Textile			
Developing countries	7.6	7.0	6.7
Least developed countries	5.0	4.7	4.5
(c) Clothing			
Developing countries	12.0	11.5	10.8
Least developed countries	9.1	8.6	8.5

40. Support to domestic agriculture by developed countries^b

	(Percentage of GDP)	
	1990	2002
	1.9	1.2

41. ODA to build trade capacity

	(Percentage of recipients' total ODA)
	2001
World	2.4
Americas	2.0
Europe	1.7
Africa	2.7
Asia	2.0
Oceania	0.2
Global programmes	4.0

42. Countries that have reached their HIPC decision point and completion point

	(Cumulative number)	
	2000	2003 ^P
Reached decision point	22	26
Reached completion point	1	8

43. Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative

	(US\$ billions (cumulative))	
	2000	2003 ^P
	34	41

44. Debt service in relation to exports of goods and services of low and middle-income countries

The annex to the Secretary-General's previous annual report (A/57/270) presented World Bank-IMF estimates based on country data available at that time. No new estimates are available for the present report.

Target 16. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth45. Unemployment rate of 15-24 year-olds^d

	(Percentage)	
	1995	1999
World	10.0	10.4
Developed regions	14.6	12.8
Countries in transition	17.0	18.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	7.6 ^q	11.9 ^q
Middle East and North Africa	25.7 ^q	26.2 ^q
Latin America and the Caribbean	12.1	15.2
Asia and the Pacific	9.9	10.4

Target 17. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries

46. Population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis

The annex to the Secretary-General's previous annual report (A/57/270) presented WHO estimates based on country data available at that time. No new estimates are available for the present report.

Target 18. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications

47. Telephone lines and cellular phones^b

	(Number per 100 population)	
	1990	2002
World	10.1	36.8
Developed regions	38.1	103.4
Developing regions	2.4	20.8
Northern Africa	2.9	17.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.1	5.5
Latin America and the Caribbean	6.4	36.4
Eastern Asia	2.4	37.8
South-central Asia	1.0	5.8
South-eastern Asia	1.4	16.3
Western Asia	10.0	41.5
Oceania	3.4	9.7

48. Personal computers and Internet users

(a) Personal computers^b

	(Number per 100 population)	
	1990	2002
World	2.5	9.9
Developed regions	8.9	36.4
Developing regions	0.3	3.2
Northern Africa	0.1	1.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.3	1.2
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.6	6.9
Eastern Asia	0.3	5.0
South-central Asia	0.0	1.0
South-eastern Asia	0.0	2.6
Western Asia	1.2	5.1
Oceania	0.0	5.8

(b) Internet users^b

	(Number per 100 population)	
	1990	2002
World	0.3	9.8
Developed regions	0.3	33.4
Developing regions	-	4.1
Northern Africa	-	1.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	-	1.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	-	7.6
Eastern Asia	-	6.9
South-central Asia	-	0.8
South-eastern Asia	-	5.6
Western Asia	-	6.3
Oceania	-	3.2

Notes

For the country/area composition of regions and other groupings used here, see the annex to the world and regional table at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_worldregn.asp.

“n.a.” indicates data not available.

“-” indicates less than half of the unit employed.

“OECD/DAC donors” refers to member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

^a Data relate to countries classified by the World Bank as low and middle-income. High-income countries are excluded from these estimates.

^b Some estimates for given years may differ from those presented in the annex to the Secretary-General’s previous annual report (A/57/270), where newly available country data have been taken into account.

^c The series shown here for this indicator, 1990-1998, are the same as those presented in last year’s annex to the Secretary-General’s annual report (A/57/270). Due to the introduction of the revised International Standard Classification of Education in 1997, time series are being re-estimated by UNESCO for 1990 to the present. These new estimates, including years since 1998, are not yet available for regions.

^d Regions according to ILO classification.

^e Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

^f Estimates have been updated from the annex to the Secretary-General’s previous annual report (A/57/270) on the basis of the latest data available. However, time trends cannot reliably be estimated at present with currently available data.

^g Indicator 18 has been broadened to cover the total adult population aged 15-49.

^h Time trends cannot reliably be estimated at present with currently available data.

ⁱ Series added pursuant to the annex to the Secretary-General’s previous annual report (A/57/270, notes h and i).

^j Data refer to surveys carried out in various years within the period 1996-2001.

^k Due to limited data availability at the country level, this series cannot reliably be estimated at the regional level.

^l Includes one large protected area (640,000 km²) established in Saudi Arabia in 1994.

^m World Bank classification.

ⁿ WHO regional classification.

^o This indicator has been broadened to cover improved sanitation in rural as well as urban areas, pursuant to the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development.

^p As at 30 June 2003.

^q Estimates based on limited data.
